When the Sharon government refused to receive a UN panel
to investigate the violence in Jenin last May, Foreign Minister
Peres termed the very intention to start such an inquiry
"a blood libel against the Jewish people." This
statement was made against the background of mounting anti-Jewish
incidents around the world, all of them immediate fallout
of the violence in Israel/Palestine. Peres' not-so-innocent
goal was to emphasize the common fate shared by Israel and
the Diaspora in order to suggest that diaspora Jews who
disagreed with Israeli policy were being traitors to their
people. Yet this connection between the Diaspora and Israel
also reflects the obvious, but rarely acknowledged, fact
that Israel itself has become the main danger to the welfare
of the Jewish people.
As early as 1948, the political philosopher Hannah Arendt
warned:
"Even if the Jews were to win the war … the
'victorious Jews' would live surrounded by an entirely hostile
Arab population, secluded inside ever threatened borders,
absorbed by physical self-defense … And all this
would be the fate of a nation that—no matter how many
immigrants it could still absorb and how it extended its
boundaries—would still remain a very small people greatly
outnumbered by hostile neighbors."
Her prophecy has sadly come true. The State of Israel has
faced incessant violence since its proclamation. Demographically,
Israel's Jewish population is and will remain a tiny minority
facing the rapidly growing Arab masses, 40 percent of whom
are today below the age of fifteen. An island of wealth
facing an ocean of poverty, Israel is condemned to live
by the sword if the Zionist structure remains intact. To
survive even in the short term, Israel will continue to
need significant population inflows from abroad. But even
if all the Jews of the world were to move to Israel, this
would only delay the showdown with its more numerous and
mostly hostile neighbors.
We must admit that structurally, i.e. independently of the
impact of particular policies, the interests of Israel and
of the Diaspora are at loggerheads. Israel was created inter
alia, to offer the Jews physical safety. Today the State
of Israel adversely affects the physical safety of the Jews,
both within its borders and elsewhere. In spite of the might
of Israel's armed forces, Israel is the only place in the
world where a Jew can be killed just for being a Jew. Today
the life of a Jew is in greater danger in Jerusalem or Tel
Aviv than in Paris or Berlin or even in Damascus or Tehran.
Moreover, the chronic conflict engendered by the establishment
of the State of Israel has spread waves of Jew-hatred to
most Muslim and Arab nations. The current intifada ignited
sparks of anti-Semitism in many parts of the world, including
Western Europe, which had been free of anti-Semitism for
several decades. Indeed, the chronic character of the Israel/Palestine
conflict was an important, albeit not the only, cause of
September 11. This observation does not apportion blame
or justify terrorism; it simply states an obvious, albeit
little articulated, connection between the creation and
perpetuation of Israel as a Jewish nation-state and the
unprecedented spread of regional violence to the rest of
the world. Rwandans, Bosnians, or black South Africans did
not spread violence to other parts of the world. Palestinians,
frustrated by their fight against Israel, did.
It is not only our physical safety, but also our moral sensitivity,
that has been adversely affected by the creation of Israel
against the will of the ambient population. The never-ending
bloody violence has numbed our sense of compassion, one
of the three defining qualities that the Talmud attributes
to the Jew—alongside timidity and propensity to do
good (BT Yevamot, 79a). It was painful to hear Paul Wolfowitz,
one of the most pro-Israel members of the American administration,
booed by thousands of Jews assembled in Washington last
April when he dared mention "innocent victims among
the Palestinians."
It would be a folly to mortgage the future of world Jewry
on the fragile State of Israel. A possible violent demise
of this valiant remnant of European nationalism in the Middle
East could spell a disaster for Judaism and the Jews. Diaspora
Jewry must acknowledge that it finds Israel's militancy,
callousness, and chutzpah repugnant, a far cry from the
values of Judaism. Instead of blindly supporting the Zionist
ideal of a nation-state for Jews, we should reconsider the
best course for preserving and strengthening Jewish life
in both the Land of Israel and the Diaspora. It is too early
to define the place reserved for the State of Israel and
for Zionism in history. While for many Jews the desirability
of the State of Israel constitutes an article of faith,
this new faith in an ethnic state is not unshakable. It
is hard to justify the State of Israel as a tool to enhance
the spiritual and material welfare of the Jews and, particularly,
to offer them a sense of physical safety. As violence continues,
we should find the courage to ask: Was the idea of a Jewish
state a viable one? Is it not the very nature of the State
of Israel as a state for the Jews that fuels and perpetuates
the conflict?
Opposition to Zionism
The most principled criticism of the Zionist idea has come
not so much from Arab writers as from Jewish scholars who
have opposed the idea of a Jewish state for over a century.
The Zionists viewed the Jews as a nation in the modern European
sense of the word. In reaction to nineteenth-century theories
of race (theories which ultimately led to Nazism), Zionism
based its definition of the Jew on biological provenance,
and sought to become what one European rabbi called "a
purely nationalist-racist movement without the least commonality
with religion." Most rabbinical authorities reacted
to the emergence of Zionism in the late nineteenth century
with undisguised hostility. Prior to the establishment of
the Jewish State, rabbis and scholars routinely objected
to the political appropriation by the Zionists of spiritual
concepts such as "Jerusalem," "Zion,"
or "Land of Israel."
Zionism postulates that Jewish history is essentially a
sequence of expulsions, massacres, and forced conversions.
According to this view, the Shoah is the ultimate proof
of the untenability of Jewish diasporas, rather than a unique
tragedy interrupting the progression towards a more tolerant
and pluralistic society. Most Zionists see no intrinsic
value in maintaining Jewish continuity beyond the borders
of Israel. For them, the traditional model of autonomous
diasporas possessing a common spiritual focus has largely
given way to a center-periphery model with the State of
Israel assuming political, administrative, and representative
functions of a center with respect to diaspora Jews.
Consequently, Israeli policies often convey the impression
that Israel represents Jews from other countries. Political
use by Israeli leaders of the Judaic term "the People
of Israel" (Am Yisrael) tends to blur distinctions
between Israeli and diaspora Jews, presenting the latter
as "temporarily away from the country." Israel
has domesticated diaspora leaders to the extent that they
now act as lobbyists for Israel rather than as representatives
of Jews. For many of these leaders, Zionism has replaced
Judaism as a religion.
The characterization of the Jewish people in terms of ethnicity
and, particularly, the attempt to cast Israel as a secular
European nation-state designated as the home for that ethnic
group, mark a major departure from Jewish tradition. Since
the Diaspora began twenty-five centuries ago, the Jewish
tradition has defined Jews as a nation only in the sense—and
to the extent—that Jews remain loyal to Torah. According
to the tradition (solidly based on scriptural evidence),
there is little meaning to a Jewish nation without Judaism.
Just as the Muslim concept of umma is based on the loyalty
to the Koran and transcends boundaries of nation-states,
the Jewish concepts of umma, Am Yisrael, or Kelal Yisrael
refer to communities that have the Torah as their common
denominator; they are not confined to any particular territory,
let alone to a nation-state.
As for the Land of Israel, the Torah posits that the land
is entrusted to the Children of Israel only if the Jewish
people live up to the standards enunciated in the Torah:
to practice morality, to pursue justice, and to obey certain
agricultural rules. The nature of our relationship to the
Land of Israel is therefore different from that of other
nations to their respective motherlands. Unlike the images
common in other cultures, Israel is not a mother who would
welcome her son whatever his misdeeds. Rather, Israel is
portrayed as a bride who can reject her partner (or even,
in Leviticus 18:28, a land that can "vomit its inhabitants")
if she disapproves of his behavior. The best known part
of the Jewish prayer book is, perhaps, Shema Israel. This
is what we read when we recite it three times a day: "Beware!
Lest you let your heart be seduced, go astray, and worship
alien deities and bow down to them. Then, the Divine anger
will be awakened, and he will block the sky and there will
be no more rain. The Land will not yield harvest, and you
will disappear from the good land that G-d gives you."
The link that the Jews have with the Land of Israel is therefore
contractual rather than organic. It is contingent on their
loyalty to the Torah, and this can be seen in many synagogues
on the day of Shavuot (Pentecost), when a special marriage
contract drawn between the Jews and the Torah is read for
all to hear.
In line with this idea of contract, the Jewish tradition
attributes the exile of the Jews from the Land to their
abandoning Torah commandments. The tradition does not view
Jews as hapless victims, but rather as makers of their own
fate. Maimonides and other classical sources indicate that
the way back to the Land of Israel is Teshuvah, i.e. repentance
and return to the commandments. Since the reason for exile
is not attributed to the superior strength of the Roman
legions, the redress for exile is not and should not be
sought in developing a mightier army. In fact, the Talmud
(BT Ketubot, 111a) refers to oaths that the Jews were to
swear prior to their second exile, in which they are enjoined
not to rebel against the nations and to re-occupy the Land
of Israel by force. Given this tradition, some Judaic scholars
see Israel's military exploits not as a sign of impending
messianic redemption but rather as a blasphemous act of
rebellion.
Opposition to Zionism has not disappeared since the time
when Zionism was a minority movement shunned by most Jews.
Most principled opposition continues to come from certain
Hasidic groups, centered in Jerusalem and New York. They
believe that the Zionist state, born in sin for which it
has never repented, has no legitimacy in terms of Jewish
history. They believe that Jews had lived in the Land of
Israel before the state, and they will remain there after
it comes to an end. According to them, the State of Israel
is an impediment to the messianic redemption. While most
Mitnaggedim (non-Hasidic Jews) take a less militant position,
they also reject the legitimacy of the State of Israel.
According to the editor of the newspaper Yated Hane'eman:
"Our participation in the state and its institutions
is performed due to the pressures of the time and the force
of circumstance, similar to our behavior under foreign regimes
outside of the land. It may be defined as stealing into
the enemy camp." It is no wonder that the late Rabbi
Eliezer Schach reportedly prayed daily that the State of
Israel should disappear without harm befalling a single
Jew. It is quite significant that the main street of Bnei
Brak, the citadel of traditional Judaism in Israel, was
recently renamed from Herzl Street to Rabbi Schach Street.
Uses of Violence
"In the long run," wrote Arendt when the idea
of a Jewish state became dominant in Zionist circles in
the mid 1940s, "there is hardly any course imaginable
that would be more dangerous, more in the style of an adventure…
It will not be easy either to save the Jews or to save Palestine
in the twentieth century: that it can be done with categories
and methods of the nineteenth century seems at the very
most highly improbable." Indeed, Israel's attempts
to suppress Palestinian resistance, which provoke worldwide
protests today, would have been perfectly acceptable to
European nations of the nineteenth century. The Zionists'
refusal to heed the prognosis about the durability of Arab
resistance to the Jewish state may be seen as "a triumph
of the will" or, conversely, as a major failure. Jews
used to believe in the power of their ideas, unsupported
by material power. It appears that nowadays Israeli leaders
cling to material power for want of ideas.
It is often said that Herzl's vision of a state for the
Jews came to life in spite of an inhospitable terrain and
the implacable hostility of the local inhabitants. However,
it may well be that it is precisely this implacable hostility
that forged the new Hebrew nation in Palestine. Since the
Zionists discarded the Jewish religion as a common denominator
of the ingathering exiles, a shared "fear of the Arabs"
became the ultimate factor of national unity. Resorting
to education as the primary tool of forging "the new
man," Zionists made consistent ideological use of the
military conflict, a natural consequence of their self-serving
vision of Palestine as "a land without a people for
a people without a land."
When Jewish babies are killed in the West Bank or Gaza,
most Israelis are outraged. However, more than a few also
wonder what kind of parents would endanger their children
by keeping them in Hebron or Netsarim. This sacrificial
rite is beginning to awaken doubts as to the very nature
of the State of Israel, which had caused hundreds of human
sacrifices from Jews and their neighbors well before it
was established, and tens of thousands since. Was it wise
to establish it? Is it worth defending with heavy sacrifices?
These questions, quite unimaginable in other countries,
are hardly rhetorical in Israel. But it is a fact that the
majority of the Jews, on whose behalf the State of Israel
was ostensibly established, enjoy more tranquil lives elsewhere
and are reluctant to join their brethren in Israel, and
not only because of fear of wars. Zionist discourse has
convinced many diaspora Jews that it is Israel that ensures
their safety and welfare from far afield. This is an erroneous
and dangerous belief. Erroneous because it ignores the structural
conflict of interests between Israel and the Diaspora, and
belittles the progress of human rights that makes Jews equal
and active citizens of their countries. Dangerous because
it lures diaspora Jewry into a mental and a physical trap.
Residual nostalgia for Zionist exploits largely explains
many Israelis' reluctant approval of the settlers, whom
they tend to admire from afar. The settlers are indeed "the
last Zionists," whose messianic fervor is genuine and
impressive. They are "the tail that wags the dog,"
that makes the retention of the territories the main preoccupation
of successive Israeli governments. The settlement momentum
is intrinsically expansive, since it relies on religious
determinism that deifies the State and sanctifies the Occupation.
The settlers accuse those who argue that the conflict can
be solved by evacuation of the West Bank and Gaza of hypocrisy.
They claim that there is no moral difference between Jewish
settlement in Hebron and in Tel Aviv. And it appears that
this view is gaining ground. Why should one rid Hebron of
Jews but leave them in Jerusalem's neighborhoods of Katamon
or Baka, which used to be no less Arab prior to 1948? Why
should one oppose Israeli occupation of Hebron and condone
the destruction of an Arab village, replaced by the University
of Tel Aviv—nowadays, ironically, the citadel of liberalism
and pacifism? If Jewish settlement is illegitimate in Gaza
why is it legitimate in Jaffa or Haifa? Such questions convey
a powerful message: We are all in the same boat. They argue
that the legitimacy of the entire Jewish presence in the
Land of Israel is in jeopardy once you start to examine
its recent record carefully. This polemic strategy, aided
by the sense of physical insecurity, keeps large segments
of the Israeli population hostage to fear. Yet it also contains
a certain truth.
Embarrassment and Double Standards
Israel's military operations, particularly against civilians,
have embarrassed Jews both in Israel and in the Diaspora
for many decades. Since Israel promotes itself as the representative
of the Jews, and most diaspora Jewish leaders enthusiastically
support this claim, the State of Israel is often associated
with Jews everywhere. Jews outside of Israel are thus put
in a difficult situation of defending the morally indefensible,
of bending their ethical standards in order to justify Israel's
actions in Bethlehem, Jenin, or Beirut. Indeed, Israel routinely,
and perhaps inevitably for any state, acts against the morality
embodied in Judaism. At the same time, since there is nothing
but Judaism that distinguishes diaspora Jews from their
fellow citizens in different countries, this blanket defense
of Israel seriously discredits Judaism.
Conceptual disparities between Israel and the Jewish diasporas
become more pronounced since the countries with sizable
Jewish communities have all adopted a liberal system of
social and political values. It is quite common in Israel
to talk in anti-liberal, anti-democratic terms; for example,
there are public discussions about building Jewish neighborhoods
or settling Jews in the Galilee so that Arab citizens do
not outnumber their Jewish compatriots in the region. Israeli
official documents routinely identify the bearer as a Jew
or a non-Jew. Structural segregation of Jews from non-Jews
is common in Israel. So is occupational discrimination,
all of which is justified by the Herzlian denomination of
Israel as a state for the Jews.
However, in the context of Western societies, it would be
inconceivable to practice ethnic or religious discrimination
in such a manner. One could imagine an international outcry
if the Front National mayor of a French town were to promote
a public housing development designated solely for Catholics.
One of Israel's dailies wryly observed that Le Pen would
be considered a bleeding-heart centrist in the Israeli political
spectrum. Israel's discriminatory practices, while often
opposed by the country's Supreme Court, conflict with the
liberal values that underpin the stability and welfare of
Jewish diasporas around the world. It is only a matter of
time before diaspora leaders, at least those who overtly
identify with the State of Israel, will face the challenge
of explaining their obvious double standard.
The primacy of the State is a dangerous belief to hold.
A few decades after the Shoah, Jews remember what happens
when the raison d'état becomes a transcendental principle
that supersedes individual morality. It may be illusory
and even dangerous to confuse the profane centrality of
Israel with the sacred centrality of the land; in order
to affirm the first aspect one has to reject or distort
the second one, and vice versa.
A garrison state inhabited by a desperate population and
armed with nuclear weapons faces the danger of a regional,
perhaps a world war. Zionism has brought about an unending
confrontation with Palestinian Arabs. This cycle of violence
has become a serious threat: it may spell the violent demise
of the State of Israel and, more importantly, a spiritual
and psychological crisis for Judaism. As some foresaw over
fifty years ago, it appears increasingly unrealistic to
preserve "the state for the Jews," an adventurous
idea to begin with, against the violent opposition of the
Palestinians, whose nationalist dispossession by the Zionists
remains at the root of the conflict. Of course, Israel's
army is capable of defeating the Palestinians, but such
a "victory" would not bring peace any closer.
Many Israeli generals have learned this the hard way, and,
once in retirement, openly decry the use of force in settling
the Israel/Palestine conflict.
Out of the Impasse
The military gains of the last fifty years seem to evaporate
as the situation on the ground between the Jordan and the
Mediterranean reverts to 1948, when an ethnic conflict for
the control of the land intensified between Jews and Arabs.
In 2002, just as in 1948, there is no clear concept of national
borders, and it is ethnic rather than political factors
that play most potently in the entire area. A growing number
of Israel's Arab citizens identify with their Palestinian
brethren while the State of Israel often treats Arab Israelis
as if they were enemy aliens. The euphoria that followed
victory in the Six-Day War, and which seemed to vindicate
the Zionists' vision and practice, has vanished altogether.
After decades of conflicting nationalist efforts from both
sides, it is the entire area from the Jordan to the sea,
not just the West Bank and Gaza, that requires a solution.
New Jerusalem suburbs of Gilo or East Talpiot, Jewish cities
of Ariel or Emanuel built on the lands conquered in 1967,
are hardly different from cities in Israel proper. Their
evacuation in an eventual territorial settlement would be
a human drama of major proportions. "Transferring"
Arab population into Jordan and Egypt, an option accepted
by about one-half of Israelis, would be equally cruel, senseless,
and probably impossible. The partition or separation that
some Israeli policy-makers, including former Prime Minister
Ehud Barak, continue to support is no longer feasible since
Jews and Arabs are too interspersed across the entire disputed
territory.
The frustration of the Palestinian Arabs, who are deprived
of most avenues of political expression, has naturally developed
into a fixation on national independence à l'israélienne.
Yet another nation-state—a Palestinian state on the
West Bank and Gaza—may only cause more pain and rancor.
Dismantlement of settlements, forced transfers of population
and other usual appurtenances of establishing nation-states
in ethnically heterogeneous areas would likely ensue. Rather
than a new nation-state, a liberal political structure based
on citizens' equal rights and, consequently, their self-interest,
may have more chances to succeed.
Israelis of very different political views, such as the
nationalist Moshe Arens, a former defense minister, and
the more conciliatory Meron Benvenisti, a former deputy
mayor of Jerusalem, agree that separation of the Jews from
the Palestinians is just a myth that regularly comes to
the surface after major acts of terror. In the same sense,
surveys show that Israelis and Palestinians expect to maintain
strong economic ties. Moreover, conflicts are easier to
settle between neighbors than between nations.
Abrahamia: An Alternative to Ethnic Nationalism
One promising arrangement could be a confederation of independently
governed areas or cantons, to be established in the territory
between the Jordan and the Mediterranean. Abrahamia (or
Ibrahimia) may be a good name for the new confederate state
since it would recall an important common ancestor recognized
by Muslims, Christians, and Jews. Such a state could be
modeled after Canada or Switzerland. Good use could be made
of elements of the Ottoman rule, which had managed diversity
and preserved peace in the region far better than most of
its successor states (be it Serbia, Turkey, Israel, or Lebanon).
Democratic confederate structures tend to moderate ethnic
or national tensions. Abrahamia could consist of cantons
sovereign in matters of culture, education, worship, internal
security, and local law. Such a structure would also enable
Orthodox Jews and secular Hebrews, whose relationship is
also profoundly acrimonious, to live their lives according
to their customs and beliefs, without the irritating interventions
of the state.
Foreign affairs, defense, monetary matters, and communication
would be entrusted to a confederate government elected by
all citizens. The sensitive issue of defense could be resolved
by stages. During the first years the armed forces should
remain mostly under the control of the Jewish cantons since
Jews, not Arabs, have been threatened with the prospect
of being "thrown into the sea" by neighboring
countries. But the army, a bulwark against foreign aggression,
should be prohibited from being used as a police force within
the confederation. Cantonal police units and a nominal confederate
police, initially aided by an international contingent,
should maintain public order and ensure peaceful relations
between diverse cantons. As memories of the bitter past
recede into history—and this may take less time than
many imagine—the defense forces should fully incorporate
all citizens.
The Law of Return, which now allows any Jew in the world
to become a citizen of Israel upon arrival (and sometimes
even before), should be broadened to include Palestinian
Arabs who would be entitled to reclaim their homes or obtain
compensation for lost property. To do so, the lands held
by the Jewish National Fund, over 90 percent of the total
territory, should be sold without discrimination to Jews
and Arabs. Compensation for lost property would constitute
a major source of funds to help Arabs buy real estate and
reduce the existing development gap between the two groups.
Economic disparities fuel violence no less than nationalist
passions, but when the economic divide coincides with the
ethnic one, violence is simply unavoidable. Income gaps
must be bridged for such a confederation to take root. Just
as a German may now freely buy a property in Alsace after
thousands died in wars disputing that territory, a Palestinian
Arab should acquire equal rights and obligations, and be
free to settle wherever he can rent or legally acquire property.
This will give him, currently the most disenfranchised,
a real stake in the success of the confederation.
Similarly, those Jews who consider it a religious commandment
to populate the entire Land of Israel should be free to
settle anywhere between the Jordan and the sea, by legal
means of course and without any special privileges. For
this to happen, individual safety and individual rights
of citizens should become the main priority of the new federation.
The majority of secular Israelis who simply want "to
be a free people in our land" (as Israel's anthem now
puts it) can continue to live "Israeli style"
in their cantons. Confederate authorities should do nothing
to ensure their Jewishness, since matters of worship and
education will be exclusive privileges of the constituent
cantons. Such an arrangement will not only alleviate the
conflict between Jews and Arabs, it will also eliminate
the tension that the State of Israel has fomented trying
to subject its Jewish citizens to the strictures of religious
law.
Details of such a confederation may take a while to work
out, and even longer to implement. At this point it is a
suggestion, an outline of an idea that breaks the cycle
of ethnic exclusivity and ends the bloody zero-sum game.
It is important to move Israeli and Palestinian political
thinking away from the notion of nation-state towards the
concept of confederation, an idea that was quite popular
in both camps prior to 1948, and, according to recent surveys,
is still popular among many Palestinians.
A Role for World Jewry
After five decades of exasperating conflict in the Middle
East, world Jewry can play a major role in transforming
the current situation along the proposed lines. Many Western
Jews have been active for years in diverse rapprochement
activities that bring Arabs and Hebrews, Muslims, Christians,
and Jews together. They run joint prayer sessions and interconfessional
discussions, even a joint Jewish-Muslim program to teach
tolerance on the basis of respective religious texts. European
and American Jews have brought expertise, commitment, and
even-handedness to a number of non-governmental projects
that foster understanding and respect of difference. Most
of these joint activities have survived the current upsurge
of violence, which in itself is a sign of their success.
Jewish academics, businesspeople, psychologists, rabbis,
and social workers from various countries have helped the
cause of tolerance in Israel for years, and their role,
as well as that of members of the Palestinian diasporas,
can only gain in importance in the new confederation.
Diaspora Jews should help transform the structurally fragile
State of Israel into a more stable and viable political
configuration. They should make their real voices heard
in the European Union, Russia, and the United States. The
vast majority of Jews are citizens of these political entities,
which gives their governments more than a geo-strategic
interest in settling the Arab-Israeli dispute. These governments,
particularly when encouraged by their respective Jewish
communities, could try to convince the Israeli public to
transform the nation-state and the territories it occupies
into a confederation that would ensure the safety of all
its inhabitants. They can also make it clear to the Palestinians
that such a confederation, rather than a quilt-like nation-state
criss-crossed by Israeli highways, is in their best long-term
interest. The challenge of making this conceptual shift
is substantial. But it must be met in order to free our
thinking of the murderous nationalist stranglehold.
At the same time, measures shall be devised to offer Israeli
Jews a refuge in various diasporas. The feeling that they
have nowhere to go, that Israel is the last frontier, that
only Israel can offer Jews physical safety, has fuelled
despair not only among Israeli Jews but also among many
Jews who choose to remain in the Diaspora. These are vestiges
of Zionist myths that have to be reassessed in pragmatic,
rather than ideological, terms. The possibility of a major
military flare-up, perhaps including weapons of mass destruction,
together with the current terrorist violence may push many
Israeli Jews to look for refuge elsewhere. It would be tragically
irresponsible of Jewish communities to insist that Israelis
should fight to the bitter end. Those governments that are
most likely to offer refuge to Israeli Jews must understand
that, by offering a choice to Israel's Jews to rebuild their
lives in their countries, they reduce the degree of despair
and weaken the incentives for violence in the region.
A two-pronged approach, on the one hand encouraging the
transformation of the nation-state of Israel into an Abrahamia
based on equality of opportunity and, on the other hand,
offering Israel's Jews an option of settling in other industrial
countries, is likely to reduce violence and to encourage
stability. It will weaken one of the most enduring conflicts
of our age and will help restore Judaism as the focus of
Jewish existence. Interminable (and sterile) discussions
of the latest political and military moves in Israel dominate
the daily experience of most Jews. This should cease, leaving
Jews the peace of mind to face important issues of Judaism
that have been eclipsed by news bulletins from the Middle
East. The Jewish return to history on-board a tank has only
endangered Jews, in body and in spirit. Shedding nationalist
illusions of power should enable Jews to focus on another
kind of return to history: a return to the Torah with its
manifold interpretations and hope for all humanity. If we
believe the Jewish tradition, this will also be the best
way to ensure Jewish presence in the Land of Israel.
